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TITLE GENGHIS KHAN: LEADERSHIP FOR THE AIRLAND BATTLE

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requirements for graduation.

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PREFACE

We must be modern Genghis Khans to fight and win the AirLand Battle! The leadership concepts of Genghis Khan are reviewed and analyzed in this paper, then applied to modern warrior-leaders. Genghis was an effective military leader whose leadership concepts remain applicable to modern warrior-leaders. Genghis' forces faced numerically superior enemies, treacherous terrain, and harsh climates. Like them, today's forces must apply Genghis' concepts to survive and win on the battlefield. His concepts correspond in analysis to the ten imperatives of AirLand Battle as described in U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations. The ten imperatives are:

- Ensure unity of effort.
- Anticipate events on the battlefield.
- Concentrate combat power against enemy vulnerabilities.
- Designate, sustain, and shift the main effort.
- Press the fight.
- Move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly.
- Use terrain, weather, deception, and operations security.
- Conserve strength for decisive action.
- Combine arms and sister services to complement and reinforce.
- Understand the effects of battle on soldiers, units, and leaders.

Genghis overcame the odds and obstacles of the enemy, weather, and terrain by applying concepts like these. Today's warrior-leader must apply such leadership.

The successful campaigns of Genghis historically validate the ten imperatives of AirLand Battle. This paper will be edited by the sponsor, Dr. Donald D. Chipman, Educational Advisor to the Commandant of Squadron Officers School, for inclusion in his pending book, The Classical View of Military Leadership. Dr. Chipman reviewed the draft of this paper and gave helpful recommendations for its successful completion. The advisor, Lt Col Rodger L. Tunnel, Army Instructor Group, Air Command and Staff College, provided invaluable advice in all technical requirements. Ms. Joan Hyatt, Librarian, Air University Library, graciously assisted in grammatical review. Beata, my wife, staunchly supported throughout this effort. Each of these persons deserves my gratitude for helping bring the lessons of Genghis Khan to the modern warrior-leader.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major William S. Taylor graduated as a Distinguished Military Graduate from the University of Tennessee in 1973. A qualified paratrooper and lieutenant of field artillery, he commanded an artillery section in Turkey. Returning to the U.S., he served as Assistant Executive Officer of a howitzer battery in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). While with this division, Major Taylor transferred to the Ordnance Corps in 1976 and commanded the Division's missile maintenance company. During this period he met and married Beata Eugenia Walker. Moving to Division Headquarters, he served as Assistant G4 for Logistics Readiness. Completing Ordnance Corps advanced schooling in 1978 and a Master of Business Administration graduate degree in 1979, Major Taylor travelled to Germany. There Major Taylor served as a staff officer in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Headquarters U.S. Army Europe and 7th Army. Returning to the U.S. in 1982, Major Taylor was assigned to the U.S. Army Missile Command, where he supervised an acquisition team as Team Chief and Contracting Officer for the Patriot Missile System. In 1987 Major Taylor was assigned as a student to the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, where he resides with Beata and their two children, Melissa and Justin.

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—TABLE OF CONTENTS—

Preface	iii
About the Author	iv
List of Illustrations	vii
Executive Summary	viii
Forward	x
CHAPTER ONE--INTRODUCTION	
Significance	1
Purpose	1
Goal	1
Audience and Use	2
Parameters	2
Definitions	3
Sources	3
Approach	5
Summary	5
CHAPTER TWO--BIOGRAPHY	
Introduction	6
Youth	6
Leader	8
Khan	8
Khan of Khan	11
Campaign--East Asia	12
Campaign--Southwest Asia	14
Campaign--Eastern Europe	16
Summary	18
CHAPTER THREE--LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS	
Ensure Unity of Effort	20
Anticipate Events on the Battlefield	21
Concentrate Combat Power Against Enemy Vulnerabilities	22
Designate, Sustain, and Shift the Main Effort	24
Press the Fight	24
Move Fast, Strike Hard, and Finish Rapidly	25
Use Terrain, Weather, Deception, and Operations Security	26
Conserve Strength for Decisive Action	27
Combine Arms and Sister Services to Complement and Reinforce	28
Understand the Effects of Battle on Soldiers, Units, and Leaders	29

CONTINUED

Summary	31
CHAPTER FOUR--APPLICATION/CONCLUSION	
Application.....	32
Conclusion.....	36
BIBLIOGRAPHY	38
APPENDIX	39

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURES

FIGURE 1--Asia at the Time of Genghis Khan	11
FIGURE 2--Campaign--East Asia	13
FIGURE 3--Campaign--Southwest Asia	15
FIGURE 4--Campaign--Eastern Europe	16

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



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REPORT NUMBER 88-2535

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR WILLIAM S. TAYLOR, USA

TITLE GENGHIS KHAN: LEADERSHIP FOR THE AIRLAND BATTLE

I. Purpose: To review the leadership concepts of Genghis Khan, analyze these concepts in relation to the ten imperatives of AirLand Battle, and apply Genghis' leadership concepts to today's warrior-leaders.

II. Problem: Genghis Khan was an effective military leader whose leadership concepts apply to modern warrior-leaders. These concepts correspond in analysis to the ten imperatives of AirLand Battle. Successful application of these concepts by modern warrior-leaders requires they be applied as demonstrated by Genghis.

III. Data: The life of Genghis Khan was characterized by leadership in battle. Early in his life Genghis learned the timeless imperatives of battle. Genghis received training in the warrior skills from his father, a Mongol chieftain or khan. After the death of his father, Genghis' family was driven onto the steppes. Genghis' skills preserved their lives against the environment and attack. His successes gained for him followers, allies, and

CONTINUED

leadership of his tribe. As Khan, he organized a regular army with an effective communications system. In a succession of battles, Genghis spread the dominance of his leadership across a united Mongolia. He defeated the Chinese border state of Hsi Hsia and China in a lengthy campaign that afforded great opportunity to apply his concepts of leadership. Genghis was soon compelled to lead a force against the Karzamian Empire--an empire whose fighting force consisted of experienced Turks, Persians, and Afghans. Even before the end of this victorious campaign, he sent a force into Russia and Bulgaria. Applying the concepts taught by Genghis, his subordinates defeated a superior force. Throughout these campaigns, Genghis applied leadership concepts corresponding to the ten imperatives of AirLand Battle described in U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations. The ten imperatives are:

- Ensure unity of effort.
- Anticipate events on the battlefield.
- Concentrate combat power against enemy vulnerabilities.
- Designate, sustain, and shift the main effort.
- Press the fight.
- Move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly.
- Use terrain, weather, deception, and operations security.
- Conserve strength for decisive action.
- Combine arms and sister services to complement and reinforce.
- Understand the effects of battle on soldiers, units, and leaders.

IV. Conclusions: The battles and campaigns of Genghis provide ample historical validity of the imperatives of AirLand Battle. Modern warrior-leaders face numerically superior enemies, forbidding terrain, and harsh weather. To survive and win, they must lead as Genghis led his warriors seven centuries ago.

V. Recommendations: Recommend the sponsor, Dr. Donald D. Chipman, Educational Advisor to the Commandant of Squadron Officers School, publish this paper in his pending book, The Classical View of Military Leadership. Further recommend the U.S. Armed Forces make this book available in its service schools and encourage its reading by warrior-leaders of all ranks.

FORWARD

This forward, penned by General Douglas A. MacArthur, expresses the thesis, purpose, and significance of this paper to today's warrior-leaders. MacArthur's praise of Genghis Khan's leadership--edited to relate fulfillment of the ten imperatives of AirLand Battle--should inspire warrior-leaders to study the timeless leadership applied by the great Mongol.

Were the accounts of all battles, save only those of Genghis Khan, effaced from the pages of history, and were the facts of his campaigns preserved in descriptive detail, the soldier would still possess a mine of untold wealth from which to extract nuggets of knowledge useful in molding an army for future war. The success of that amazing leader, beside which the triumphs of most other commanders pale into insignificance, are proof sufficient of his unerring instinct for the fundamental qualifications of an army.

He devised an organization appropriate to conditions then existing [ensure unity of effort]; he raised the discipline and the morale of his troops to a level never known in any other army [understand the effect of battle on soldiers, units, and leaders] . . . he spent every available period of peace to develop subordinate leaders and to produce perfection of training throughout the army [anticipate events on the battlefield], and, finally he insisted on speed of action, a speed which by comparison with the other forces of his day was almost unbelievable [move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly]. Though he armed his men with the best equipment of offense and defense [combine arms and sister services to complement and reinforce] . . . he refused to encumber them with loads that would immobilize his army [conserve strength for decisive action]. Over great distances his legions moved so rapidly and secretly as to astound his enemies [use terrain, weather, deception, and operations security] and practically to paralyze their powers of resistance [concentrate combat power against enemy; vulnerabilities] . . . On the battlefield his troops maneuvered so swiftly and skillfully and struck with such devastating speed [designate, sustain, and shift the main effort] that . . . they defeated armies overwhelmingly superior to themselves in number [press the fight].

It is these conceptions that the modern soldier seeks . . . they stand revealed as kernels of truth, as applicable today in our effort to produce an efficient army as they were when, seven centuries ago, the great Mongol applied them . . . We cannot violate these laws and still produce and sustain the kind of army that alone can insure the integrity of our country and the permanency of our institutions if ever again we face the grim realities of war (4:63,64).

General Douglas A. MacArthur

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

We must be modern Genghis Khans to fight and win the AirLand Battle!

A view of military leadership as applied by Genghis Khan is important in today's AirLand Battle where highly mobile, combined forces face a numerically superior enemy of proven fighting capability. Like the outnumbered, light forces of Genghis Khan, today's warrior-leaders must meet and defeat the enemy on difficult terrain and in inclement weather.

PURPOSE

This paper reviews the leadership concepts of Genghis Khan, analyzes these concepts in relation to the ten imperatives of AirLand Battle, and applies Genghis' leadership for use by today's warrior-leaders. The thesis is--Genghis Khan was an effective military leader whose leadership concepts remain applicable to modern warrior-leaders.

GOAL

After acceptance and editing, this work will be available for study by warrior-leaders. It is expected to be a chapter in the pending book of Dr. Donald Chipman, Senior Educational Advisor to Squadron Officers School. His book will be titled The Classical View of Military Leadership.

AUDIENCE AND USE

Warrior-leaders studying leadership and operational art in the U.S. Armed Forces are expected to be the primary users of this work. The lessons should be studied and used in the operational and tactical sense as Genghis Khan applied them. Genghis offers lessons applicable to senior leaders planning and conducting theater warfare. Within the recorded examples of his leadership exists a bounty of lessons for junior leaders. They need only bear in mind the scale of battle and application is smaller for them.

PARAMETERS

This paper does not cover the biography of Genghis Khan in detail. Review is limited to examples of effective leadership selected to illustrate Genghis' leadership concepts within the ten imperatives of AirLand Battle. The 100 hours provided for this effort did not provide time for review and use of all possible sources. The selected bibliography of authoritative works by military historians provides ample material for review and analysis of Genghis Khan's leadership.

His campaigns are analyzed within the ten imperatives of AirLand Battle described in Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations. More extensive treatment is given those imperatives most applied by Genghis. Warrior-leaders reviewing this paper should note imperatives cannot be completely isolated in historical examples. Where one imperative is discussed, other complementary imperatives will naturally appear within the context of successful campaigns and battles. Because of this complementary relationship among the imperatives, the balance of

treatment is achieved without devoting equal lines to each imperative. The imperative to "use operations security" is not specifically analyzed. Examples were not found of how Genghis applied this imperative. We know he applied operations security because his enemies neither anticipated nor defeated his plans.

DEFINITIONS

English terminology is used in the place of Mongolian terminology to avoid encumbering the reader with lists of definitions. Three exceptions are noted here. Among the several spellings rendered in various sources for the great Khan's name (e.g. Genghis, Jenghiz, Chingis), "Genghis" is used in this paper. The term "Genghis" is unique and may be given any of several meanings, including "ocean". "Khan" is used rather than its English equivalent of "chief" (khan is not a family name but a title). "Mangoday" is the name given the most elite unit of volunteers in Genghis' forces. Proper noun spellings have been selected from the sources for ease of pronunciation. Explanation of the ten AirLand Battle imperatives is in the Appendix.

SOURCES

Trevor Dupuy, Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), calls Genghis "one of the three greatest military geniuses in history" (1:x). Dupuy, a noted military historian, authored books on the lives of several great leaders, extending in time from Alexander the Great through Winston Churchill. His work was selected for his emphasis on sound strategy and military organization.

General Sir Richard Gale, a British military expert and historian, authored books on campaigns from the ancient battles of the Bible through World War II. His work, Kings at Arms, was selected for his timeless view of leadership concepts.

Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, a highly recognized military historian and strategist, authored his works in Great Britain following World War I. Study of his works greatly influenced the operational art of the Germans and Israelis. His work on Genghis was selected for its emphasis on combined arms and shock tactics as necessary leadership concepts.

General Douglas MacArthur was Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army when he wrote the comments on Genghis in the Forward. MacArthur believed the battles of Genghis Khan provided sufficient information for development of a successful force. His comments were selected for their expression of the purpose behind this paper.

Desmond Martin wrote Genghis may have understood and applied the principles of war more successfully than any other leader (5:46,47). His book was selected for his valuable access to Chinese and Mongol historical material.

Ethan Heral was widely experienced as a soldier in the Israeli Defense Forces. His work, originally entitled Exposed to Death, adds a needed perspective on the importance of courage and morale in successful military leadership.

Harold Lamb's article, published in Asia magazine in 1926, furnishes a valuable historical account of Genghis from life to death. Lamb provides

examples and comments on the events which developed and manifested the leadership of Genghis.

"FM 100-5, Operations, is the Army's keystone warfighting manual. It explains how Army forces plan and conduct campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements in conjunction with other services and allied forces" (S:1). Genghis' leadership is analyzed and applied for current use within the framework of this manual.

APPROACH

Chapter Two provides an abbreviated biography of Genghis Khan with emphasis on the events that developed and demonstrated his leadership concepts. The campaign maps in the chapter assist in the quick understanding of Genghis' battles and campaigns. Chapter Three analyzes these concepts within the parameters of the ten Imperatives of AirLand Battle. These imperatives are explained in detail in the Appendix. The fourth and final chapter applies Genghis' leadership concepts to modern warrior-leaders.

SUMMARY

"The leader, as well as the creator, of the best army in the world during the Middle Ages (1:xiii)," Genghis applied examples for today's warrior-leaders through his campaigns. This paper provides an abbreviated biography, leadership analysis, and current application for modern warrior-leaders. The next chapter reviews selected events important to the development and demonstration of Genghis' leadership.

Chapter Two

BIOGRAPHY

INTRODUCTION

The life of Genghis Khan was characterized by leadership in battle. Early in his life Genghis learned the timeless imperatives of battle. This biographical chapter reviews selected events in Genghis' life--from his birth on the Mongolian Steppes to his death during a campaign. These events provide a basis for leadership analysis. They are compared with the ten imperatives of AirLand Battle in the next chapter. In the final chapter these concepts are applied for today's warrior-leaders. The maps show the tribes and empires against whom Genghis campaigned.

YOUTH

Genghis was born into a society struggling for survival. In 1161 A.D. a Chinese and Tarter army defeated the Mongol tribes, eliminating efforts to unite them as a people. Yesukai, leader of a Mongol tribe, served Togru, the Kerait Khan and Ch'eng-Tsung, the Chinese Emperor (5:59,63). In 1162 a son was born to Yesukai (3:6). The child entered ". . . a barren world, populated only by the hunters and the hunted, where men who do not starve or freeze to death are slashed open by the weapons of other men" (7:955). Genghis' environment demanded quick development of warrior skills and hastened development of his leadership.

Genghis--named Temuchin at birth and so called until 44 years of age--was trained early by Yesukai in the warrior skills. These skills later saved the lives of Yesukai's surviving family (1:16,17). While visiting his future father-in-law, the Khongirad Khan, Genghis--age 13--received news the Tartars had poisoned Yesukai. Genghis inherited leadership, but without Yesukai's commanding presence, neighboring tribes threatened attack (7:957-957). Changing allegiance to a warrior named Targutai, the tribe drove Genghis, his mother and brothers onto the steppes to starve. Struggling to the mountain foothills for concealment and food, the family survived on plants, fish, and small animals (1:2).

Learning that Genghis remained alive, Targutai sent warriors to capture and kill him. Targutai's warriors captured Genghis and left him under guard while they celebrated (7:958; 1:3). Genghis overcame his guard and hid in a nearby lake. He located an old friend of his father who hid him in a cart loaded with wool. His pursuers searched it with their spears, but Genghis remained silent and still when a spear pierced his leg. Genghis evaded capture and escaped on horseback (7:958). This practical graduation with honors--from the Mongol school of survival, resistance, and escape--marked a major step in the development of Genghis' military skills and leadership. The tremendous adversity survived in his youth possibly enabled him to understand the effects of battle on others. This leadership trait is analyzed in Chapter Three.

LEADER

Genghis' successful escape precipitated a growth in his following and alliances. Hearing Genghis survived Targutai's efforts to kill him, warriors of Yesukai's old tribe began to return (1:3). Genghis' followers defeated Targutai's warriors in a battle, revealing early signs of Genghis' genius in leadership (1:7). New warriors were attracted by the reports of Genghis' bravery and successful leadership (2:61). Genghis developed an alliance with the Khongirad Khan from whom he claimed his bride (5:61). Warriors from his bride's tribe returned with the procession and also joined his ranks (1:3). Honoring the Kerait Khan with a valuable gift, he made an important alliance to complement and reinforce his following of warriors (5:61). When the Merkit Mongols raided Genghis' camp and kidnapped his wife, the Kerait Khan provided warriors to aid in pursuit. Genghis' defeat of the Merkits drew even more warriors to his following (1:6).

KHAN

Due to his military successes and growing following, the Borjigin Mongols selected him as khan in 1190. As Borjigin Khan, Genghis built a regular army based on the decimal system. He organized squads of ten men, companies of 100, and regiments of 1,000. From his ranks he chose proven warriors to be leaders. Genghis then established his communications branch--tough, dedicated riders responsible for carrying messages (1:9,10,18,19). Genghis' messengers, leaders, and warriors were soon tested as an organization in combat. Also tested were the leadership concepts developed by Genghis during this time. These concepts--moving

fast, striking hard, and finishing rapidly with combined elements--will be analyzed in a more advanced state of development in Chapter Three.

When in 1198 the Chinese Emperor, Madaku, asked the Kerait Khan's assistance in crushing a Tartar rebellion, Genghis combined forces and marched with Togrul. Catching the Tartars in retreat toward a river, Togrul and Genghis maneuvered along both river banks. Trapped with the river in front, the Chinese to the rear, and Mongol forces attacking on each flank, the Tartars were crushed (5:68,69). Due to their aggressive manner of pressing the fight, Genghis' warriors were named 'the Raging Torrents' (7:1030). Victory against the Tartars enhanced Genghis' reputation and added more warriors to his army. Yet this growth of Genghis' reputation and power were matched by a growing determination among his enemies to destroy him.

Genghis thwarted the challenges of his enemies with superior leadership. He gathered intelligence and anticipated the decisions of his enemy. Then--under a cloak of deception--he concentrated strength against enemy vulnerabilities and launched fast, hard, finishing strikes. Genghis gathered intelligence of planned surprise attacks by a tribal coalition under Jamuga, a Juriat Mongol. Before Jamuga could concentrate forces, Genghis made preemptive strikes and defeated the coalition. Gaining experience, more warriors, and confidence, Genghis marched his army to inflict a final defeat on the Tartars (5:72-74). This series of victories made Genghis "the unchallenged leader of eastern Mongolia" (1:11).

Although Genghis continued to organize and train his warriors, he nearly suffered defeat due to lack of unity among his chieftains. Jamuga persuaded old Togru and his son to turn against Genghis. Betrayed and outnumbered, Genghis fought to a stalemate, then conducted a withdrawal to rally support. Overcoming initial reluctance, he eventually received support from most of the eastern Mongol chieftains (1:11,12). Gaining intelligence that the Kerait were celebrating prematurely, Genghis conducted a forced march and attacked with surprise (5:82). Choosing life over death, many Kerait warriors joined Genghis' army (1:13). From this near defeat Genghis learned a valuable lesson in leadership--unity of effort in support of the commander's intent is essential (2:64). However, the independent nature of the chieftains and Mongol society delayed implementation of his concepts on unity.

Genghis attained a greater appreciation for deception and added an ability to quickly shift the main effort in battle to his leadership skills. Although Genghis' leadership reached across eastern and central Mongolia, Jamuga again posed a threat. Jamuga organized a new coalition around the Naimans of western Mongolia (5:84,85). Genghis learned of the new threat from intelligence sources. He quickly briefed his chieftains and obtained unity of effort before marching (1:14). Maneuvering rapidly to surprise his enemy, Genghis sent a spearhead to make contact and pretend to flee. Luring the Naiman force into a prepared ambush, Genghis sprung his trap. While the enemy was held in contact by his center, Genghis surprised and unbalanced the Naimans with a surprise attack against their flank. Through brilliant leadership, Genghis' army defeated

this numerically superior force (2:65). This important victory at Chakirmaut enabled Genghis to consolidate all Mongolian tribes into one Mongolian force.




FIGURE 1--Asia at the Time of Genghis Khan (2:58)

KHAN OF KHANS

Genghis could ensure unity of effort within the combined Mongol force after Chakirmaut. The Mongol chieftains gathered at the capitol of Karakorum in 1206 and appointed Genghis the Khan of Khans (1:16,17).

These previously independent chieftains gave Genghis unquestioning allegiance (2:66).

Dread of his anger, respect for his implacable determination and utter courage held the wild nomads bound to him In their eyes he had become an ideal leader For the first time in several centuries the . . . clans were united under one authority (7:1031).

The chieftains also named him Genghis--a term possibly predicting he would cover the earth like an ocean (1:17) with the Raging Torrents (7:1030).

Genghis entered a period of extensive intelligence analysis and continued training and organizing of his forces. Continuing his proven decimal system of organization, he added divisions of 10,000 warriors. He placed increased emphasis on training, combining regulars and reserves in large maneuvers (1:18). Throughout this period of organization and training Genghis evaluated intelligence reports, particularly those from merchants who journeyed between Mongolia and China. The Chinese depended on the Great Wall and internal strife among the tribes to weaken any threat from the Mongols. Although Genghis felt certain the Chinese would attempt to destroy the new Mongol unity, intelligence estimates of Chinese strength and resources made him reluctant to launch a preemptive strike (2:73).

CAMPAIGN--EAST ASIA

Realizing the Chinese Emperor possessed great wealth, a large army, and many generals skilled at war (7:1032), Genghis displayed a keen sense of conserving strength for decisive action. Desiring experience against an

enemy who used Chinese tactics and organization, he attacked the border state of Hsi Hsia in 1205. Genghis' warriors proved superior in maneuver warfare against the Hsi Hsia forces, but were stalled by their fortified cities. Genghis instituted special equipment development and training for siege warfare. With these innovations victory was achieved in 1210 (1:30,31). Gaining experience against Chinese-type forces and fortifications, Genghis attacked China in 1211 (2:74,75).

In the first great demonstration of his leadership, Genghis in 1211 led 200,000 Mongol warriors against the Chinese (1:33). Genghis directed a large force toward Beijing and deceived the Chinese into focusing on this army. A larger force of three Mongol armies crossed the Great Wall further west, then maneuvered to crush the Chinese between the two Mongol forces (2:75). Dupuy believes "he attacked the Chinese before they were completely ready for battle, probably while they were still marching through the passes" (1:37). Genghis' forces easily defeated Chinese maneuver units and proved capable of reducing the fortified cities. Fires from ballistae and catapults covered the fast, hard assault of Mongol cavalry and engineers (1:41,42). Genghis' concepts and tactics defeated the Chinese. Leaving a trusted general, Mukhalli, to oversee China, Genghis returned to Karakorum and looked forward to peace. He established diplomatic relations and trade agreements with his neighbors, including the powerful Shah of Karzamia to his west (2:82).




FIGURE 2--Campaign--East Asia (1:36)

CAMPAIGN--SOUTHWEST ASIA

Genghis preferred not to fight the powerful combined forces of Turks, Persians, Afghans and other Moslems commanded by the Shah.

Unfortunately, he was forced to choose war when the Shah humiliated a diplomatic mission sent by Genghis. An official of the Shah hung several Mongol merchants accused of spying. When Genghis sent diplomats to protest this execution, the Shah executed the chief diplomat and shamed the remainder. Genghis summoned his reserves and prepared for war (2:82,83).




FIGURE 3--Campaign--Southwest Asia (1:60)

In 1219 Genghis advanced with a force of "200,000 warriors, plus a complete engineer and siege train" (1:62). Genghis took the city of Bukhara. To the north his general, Sabutai, captured Ortrar. To the south his general, Jochi, captured Khojend. While the Shah dispersed his 400,000 warriors to reinforce fortified cities along the front of these attacks, another general, Jebei attacked further south. With Sabutai and Jochi turning to attack the Shah's cities one at a time, Genghis maneuvered across a supposedly impassable desert and surprised the Shah from the rear (2:83,84;1:66,67). "Assaulted on all fronts, his principal cities fallen and with the initiative lost, the Shah faced utter defeat. The Shah's armies defeated in battle and his people all seized with terror, his will to fight evaporated" (2:84). Genghis entered this campaign to punish the Shah for murder and disrespect. After he achieved that objective Genghis settled for peace in Southwest Asia (2:88).

CAMPAIGN--EASTERN EUROPE

While still at war with the Shah's forces, Genghis authorized a scouting campaign into Europe (6:68). Sabutai and Jebei advanced in 1221 over the Caucasus into Georgia. Using deception as Genghis taught them, the Mongol generals pretended to flee. The Georgian force pursued them into a prepared ambush and were crushed (1:85). The Prince of Galicia assembled a combined Russian and Kipchak army near the Dnieper River to halt the Mongols. Sabutai sent envoys to the Russians in an effort to avoid further combat on his scouting mission. The Russians killed the Mongol envoys and compelled Sabutai to again defend international respect

for Mongol citizens (2:86,87). In 1223 Sabutai and Jebel attacked the superior Russian force (1:89). Dupuy writes ". . . in a day of savage fighting the two brilliant Mongol generals destroyed the Russian army" (1:89). When Genghis developed subordinates into leaders, he created masters at the art of war.




FIGURE 4--Campaign--Eastern Europe (1:87)

Sabutai and Jebel rode through Bulgaria and returned to report to Genghis in Mongolia, where he waited to hear the results of their scouting mission (2:87). Genghis apparently envisioned a large campaign against Europe, though seemingly unjustified by any threat to Mongol security.

(3:31). Genghis returned to China in 1226 to put down rebellion. He was severely wounded in one of the early battles of this campaign (1:91). While dying, he spoke these words to his sons, "If you want to retain your possessions and conquer your enemies, you must make your subjects submit willingly and unite your energies to one end . . ." (5:303). To his dying breath Genghis emphasized unity of effort.

SUMMARY

Genghis' life was a progression of leadership and application. From early childhood he was conditioned to battle. Accustomed to freezing winters, blistering summers, and rugged terrain, Genghis adapted weather and terrain to defeat superior forces. He placed highest value on quality of leadership and training, and often defeated numerically superior forces. Genghis gathered intelligence, developed a campaign plan, then gave subordinates authority to execute the plan. Chapter Three presents an analysis of Genghis' leadership concepts compared to the ten imperatives of AirLand Battle.

Chapter Three

LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS

Today's warrior-leaders need operational examples of applied leadership. Genghis Khan provides these examples! This chapter analyzes leadership concepts selected from the campaigns and battles of Genghis. Warrior-leaders of modern, mobile forces--facing a superior enemy in hostile terrain and weather--can increase opportunity for victory by applying Genghis' leadership concepts. The leadership concepts of Genghis will be analyzed in comparison to the ten imperatives of AirLand Battle:

While initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization characterize successful AirLand Battle operations, the imperatives . . . provide more specific guidance than the principles of war and the AirLand Battle tenets, and apply to all operations. They are historically valid and fundamentally necessary for success on the modern battlefield. The ten imperatives of AirLand Battle are--

- Ensure unity of effort.
- Anticipate events on the battlefield.
- Concentrate combat power against enemy vulnerabilities.
- Designate, sustain, and shift the main effort.
- Press the fight.
- Move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly.

- Use terrain, weather, deception, and operations security.
- Conserve strength for decisive action.
- Combine arms and sister services to complement and reinforce.
- Understand the effects of battle on soldiers, unit, and leaders (8:23).

The campaigns of Genghis Khan provide ample historical validity of battlefield success.

ENSURE UNITY OF EFFORT

Genghis clearly communicated the intent of his plan, then delegated authority while retaining responsibility for risks (8:23). He sent generals on missions with only a broad statement of commander's intent, and trusted them to make correct decisions (5:6). After Sabutai's succession of victories in Persia, Russia, and Bulgaria, Genghis praised him for so fearlessly exposing himself to danger while leading his warriors (5:7). While praising his subordinates for success, Genghis accepted responsibility for permitting initiative and risk. Promptly after a brigade commander was beaten by the son of the Shah of Karzamia, Genghis conducted an on-site inspection and provided positive criticism of the tactical error. Satisfied the practical lessons were learned, Genghis gave no punishment. He believed decisions are made best by the commander at the scene of battle. This concept highly motivated his subordinates to succeed in their missions (5:7).

Genghis trained his force repetitively in the same way he planned for them to fight. He held subordinates responsible for training the warriors under their command and created cohesive units (5:41).

By means of daily exercises and games he trained his warriors to ride, turn, and attack as units until they became extremely skillful in riding and fighting together Because they trained and practiced as units, [Genghis'] men could move without delay in response to his orders (1:7).

The rigid, realistic training commanded by Genghis greatly influenced one of his earliest victories. By training his warriors to use longbows in conjunction with cavalry charges, Genghis broke an attack by his first enemy, Targutai. Targutai attacked with 30,000 warriors against Genghis 20,000. Genghis' scouts screened and warned of the attack in time for a hasty defensive preparation. Combining the arms of light cavalry with longbows and heavy cavalry, Genghis' forces crushed Targutai's assault (1:7,8). Disciplined training in cohesive units yielded unity of effort in shaping events on the battlefield.

ANTICIPATE EVENTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD

Growing in wisdom and experience, Genghis learned to gather intelligence and to anticipate the decisions of the enemy commander. "Prior to any declaration of hostilities extreme care was taken to obtain full information on the political, economic and military situation . . ." (5:27). Dupuy credited Genghis with an intelligence system that in "thoroughness excelled all others of the Middle Ages" (1:43). Early in his development Genghis preempted several attacks from other tribes after learning of the plots from his intelligence system. Intelligence gathering

enabled Genghis to achieve the great victory at Chakirmaut where he lured the Naiman coalition into a prepared ambush (1:14; 2:65). Following the victory at Chakirmaut, Genghis extensively studied intelligence reports on the Chinese. These reports greatly influenced his decision to postpone attack until gaining experience against Chinese-type forces (2:72-74). In like manner Genghis learned much critical information about the Karzamian Empire before attacking in 1219. Merchants supplemented information gained from scouts and spies. He gave closest attention to details of terrain, fortifications, and enemy strengths and weaknesses (5:27). Intelligence enabled Genghis to anticipate events on the battlefield and to shape the battle by predicting his enemy's decisions. He compelled the Shah to react and reinforce his capitol city, then surprised and defeated him with a rear attack. Genghis actually created a vulnerability in this example. Genghis combined outstanding intelligence with surprise and maneuver to concentrate combat power against enemy vulnerabilities.

CONCENTRATE COMBAT POWER AGAINST ENEMY VULNERABILITIES

Genghis examined the Shah's inherent vulnerabilities and created new vulnerabilities subject to attack. Genghis secured his main effort and concentration by sending his son, Juji, to attack the southern Syr Darya River zone. The Shah reacted to this diversion by sending his elite force under his son Jelaladdin. Jelaladdin beat back the diversion, but the Mongols succeeded in diverting the Shah's attention south. Genghis sent a

probe toward the capitol, Samarkand, and caused the Shah to reinforce his right flank (3:12,13).

With the Shah's warriors dispersed in a north-south line of fortified cities, Genghis attacked the Shah's left flank with his main force of three armies. The two armies under his sons Juji and Jagatai turned south, defeating in detail the Shah's clumped forces along the Syr Darya line. Genghis also anticipated the Shah's next decision--to commit his reserves. Genghis unbalanced the Shah by attacking his unguarded rear (3:13,14). Liddell Hart observed, "Rarely, if ever, in the history of war has the principle of surprise been so dramatically or completely fulfilled" (3:15). Genghis used deception to create a vulnerability, then concentrated against his enemy at the vulnerable point.

Genghis finally faced the force of Karzamian shock troops still fighting under the personal command of Jelaladdin. Using deception, he sent forward a reserve regiment under his personal standard. Jelaladdin attacked in hope of capturing Genghis. Genghis was to the rear of the reserve regiment, personally commanding a regular regiment. Genghis counterattacked, rolled back Jelaladdin's flank, and encircled the Karzamian assault force. In a synchronized attack Yasotay crashed the fierce Mangoday and another regiment into the rear of Jelaladdin's uncommitted reserves. With Karzamian relief cut, Genghis rapidly gained the victory (6:64).

DESIGNATE, SUSTAIN, AND SHIFT THE MAIN EFFORT

The forces under Genghis' overall command entered into combat with Europeans while the Karzamian campaign was still underway. Genghis taught his subordinates to enter hostile territory with three or more on-line columns. Each column agilely maneuvered to concentrate (by plan) when another column contacted an enemy force. Ahead of the columns a screening force gathered information on enemy strengths and vulnerabilities (5:29). Applying the same leadership concepts Genghis applied to defeat the Shah, his generals Sabutai and Jebel rode across the Caucasus into Russia. Facing vastly superior Russian and Kipchak forces, the Mongol generals put their training to superior use. They retreated for several days, stringing out the enemy forces. Agilely wheeling toward both flanks, the Mongols crushed first the faster cavalry of the Prince of Galicia, then the less mobile forces from Kiev (5:39). Genghis' subordinates used deceptive maneuver and created vulnerability by dispersing the enemy. They concentrated against the enemy elements one at a time, shifting the main effort until the entire opposing force was defeated. The final shifting of main effort was required to defeat a small but valiant Russian unit of knights. Refusing to break ranks or withdraw, these warriors held the line until the Mangoday crashed into their ranks (6:68). Genghis' subordinates designated, sustained, and shifted the main effort, concentrating the Mongol force and pressing the fight.

PRESS THE FIGHT

Genghis' forces pressed the fight, seeking to gain and maintain the initiative. The center column held the enemy in contact while the other

columns attacked the enemy's flanks and rear (1:25;5:159). Martin records, "This was a common maneuver with the Mongols and was almost certainly followed by a general onslaught and the crushing victory . . ." (5:159). Genghis displayed flexibility in fighting in the open with agility and depth or combining arms and weapons to conduct siege warfare. When the Mongol forces assaulted the Karzamian city of Nishapur in 1221, they encountered a determined and capable enemy. The Karzamian defenders were armed with 3,000 javelin-throwing ballistae and 500 catapults. To assault the city Genghis' force brought forward 3,000 ballistae, 3,000 catapults, and 700 weapons designed to toss flaming naphtha (5:30). Martin records ". . . the Mongols maintained an almost ceaseless assault" (5:30). Genghis' warriors pressed the fight until the enemy defenders were destroyed (5:31). Genghis thoroughly understood, instilled, and applied the concept described in AirLand Battle doctrine as pressing the fight "tenaciously and aggressively" (8:24). Mongol engagements were characterized by violence.

MOVE FAST, STRIKE HARD, AND FINISH RAPIDLY

In his surprise rear attack against the Shah, Genghis led 40,000 warriors across a desert thought impassable by native enemy forces (3:15). Genghis used terrain and deception to move and secure his main effort--striking hard from the rear. When Genghis' columns contacted an enemy force, messengers took intelligence on the enemy to Genghis and subordinate commanders. The nearest Mongol commander attacked on his initiative if the opposing force was small. When the enemy was strong,

Genghis, or his authorized subordinate, moved fast to concentrate forces, struck hard against the most vulnerable point, and finished the fight rapidly. Genghis often used synchronized mobility and maneuver to surprise and defeat superior forces. The fast and disciplined movement of the Mongol warriors enabled them to concentrate first at the enemy's vulnerable point (2:78; 1:23-25).

USE TERRAIN, WEATHER, DECEPTION, AND OPERATIONS SECURITY

Genghis proved a master at using terrain and weather as described in FM 100-5, Operations--"to protect [his] own forces and to destroy those of the enemy" (8:24). Genghis maintained operations security by always avoiding predictable, repetitious patterns during conduct of operations (1:24). He also proved a master of deception. When Genghis' outnumbered force of 45,000 faced the Naiman coalition of 55,000, Genghis' warriors constructed dummies for daytime display. At night each Mongol warrior lit five campfires. This act deceived the Naimans into believing the Mongol force much larger than it really was. The deception caused the Naimans to delay taking offensive action. Gaining time to rest and prepare his forces, Genghis ultimately achieved victory (5:87, 88).

Genghis used maneuver to create deception in his campaign against Hsi Hsia. He created the deception of striking camp--even posting a rearguard to cover his pretended withdrawal. Expecting to meet only the rearguard, the enemy force rode headlong into Genghis' prepared ambush. The Mongols crushed the Hsi Hsia force (5:118). Defeat of this force prepared Genghis and his warriors for warfare against the Chinese (2:74). Following the war with China, Genghis felt compelled to lead his forces to war in

Southwest Asia. During this campaign he demonstrated his most brilliant use of combining uses of terrain, weather, and deception.

Forcing the Shah of Karzamia to commit his reserves and piecemeal forces along the vulnerable fortifications of the Syr Darya line, Genghis used deception to secure a flanking maneuver. Concealing the movement of his army behind the covering attacks of two supporting armies, Genghis used scorching desert terrain to launch a surprise attack at the enemy's rear (2:83,84). The Shah's defenders thought the desert impassable by Genghis' attacking forces. Genghis' deceptive maneuver across this desert caught the Shah's forces by such complete surprise they lost their will to fight (2:84).

CONSERVE STRENGTH FOR DECISIVE ACTION

Surprise maneuvers, mobility, and violent attacks gained rapid victories and conserved Mongol strength (1:25;5:29). When a capable, determined enemy prevented quick victory, Genghis' trained subordinates employed deception to conserve strength. Such was the case when Jelaladdin's Turkish shock troops stalemate a Mongol regiment. The Mangoday were thrown into fierce battle against the center of the Karzamian force. Both sides suffered heavy casualties throughout a day of combat. The Mongols broke contact at nightfall and lit many campfires. Deceiving Jelaladdin into believing they had camped to hold their ground, the Mongols executed a concealed withdrawal (6:25). The ability to withdraw with stealth was made possible by the disciplined training of the Mongol force. Realizing numerically superior forces would often confront

him, Genghis ordered his Mangoday to train all volunteer warriors in the force (6:60). Genghis trained his forces to win and conserve their lives in battle. He also trained them to combine the firepower of multiple arms for shock and cover.

COMBINE ARMS AND SISTER SERVICES TO COMPLEMENT AND REINFORCE

Genghis demonstrated awareness of a the AirLand Battle concept-- "... greatest combat power results when weapons and other hardware . . . units, and other service elements of different capabilities are employed together to complement and reinforce each other" (8:25). He created his standard formation of five ranks--the front two armored and with swords and lances, the rear three with longbows, javelins, and no armor. The rear three ranks maneuvered to the front to thin enemy ranks at long and medium ranges. His light troops then withdrew while the heavy front two ranks assaulted in hand-to-hand combat. When time permitted Genghis softened the enemy with artillery (3:10,11). Yaks and camels were used to tow artillery and engineer equipment to the point of decision (2:83). If the situation warranted, Genghis ordered his elite reserve into battle (3:36).

Genghis applied these tactics and concepts in his war against the Naiman coalition. Genghis aligned his formations and assigned subordinate commanders responsibility for center, flanks, and rear. He assumed personal command of the Mangoday and held them in reserve. He weakened the Naimans with his light troops, then struck hard with his heavy ranks. The spearhead of his assault pushed the Naimans back to

the foot of a mountain. When his warriors enveloped the enemy flanks, the Naimans withdrew onto the mountain slope. With their third charge the combined arms of Genghis' attack force pushed the enemy to the mountain summit. Most Naiman warriors surrendered in defeat (3:89-91).

Liddell Hart credits Genghis with developing "a perfect combination of fire and shock troops," as well as the first use of offensive "artillery preparation" (3:10). Genghis' forces learned artillery preparation and its value against fortifications. Artillery was used to soften defenses prior to storming the city walls (3:247). He appreciated the use of machines to complement and reinforce his cavalry, but he demonstrated understanding with what is stated today in AirLand Battle doctrine, ". . . war is fundamentally a contest of wills, fought by men, not machines" (3:25).

UNDERSTAND THE EFFECT OF BATTLE ON SOLDIERS, UNITS, AND LEADERS

More can be written concerning Genghis' understanding and application of this imperative than any other. He cared for his warriors and prepared them for battle. In the Karzamian campaign he led them across dangerous mountains and crossed a scorching desert with his column-- with no threat to their destruction (3:8). His insistence on training of warriors and development of subordinates was analyzed with previous imperatives. Dupuy wrote, "With the possible exception of Alexander the Great, no other great general in history made such a conscientious effort as Genghis to teach his lieutenants all he knew about warfare, and then to give them an opportunity to develop their talents as independent army

commanders" (1:xv). In apparent agreement General Sir Richard Gale noted, "This trait of his of placing confidence in his subordinates had run like a shaft of light throughout his career" (2:87).

Genghis' trust in the Mangoday and their leader, Yasotay, provides an example like the AirLand Battle concept, ". . . well trained, physically fit soldiers in cohesive units retain the qualities of tenacity and aggressiveness longer than those which are not" (8:26). In a key battle a regiment under Chafa Navyon faced 250,000 Chinese. The Mongol regulars doubted their capability to do more against such a Chinese force than to die bravely. Yasotay encouraged Chafa Navyon to march to the Chinese rear, attack, seize and maintain the initiative.

The Mangoday crashed into the center of the Chinese rear formations and penetrated their ranks. The Chinese responded with artillery--bursting bamboo tubes of burning naphtha over the Mongol attackers. The Mangoday bravely pressed the attack (6:50). Heral's translation states:

The smashing attack of the Mangoday personnel enveloped in flame broke the Chinese formations . . . When the Mangoday personnel overcame them without clothes, without hair, without skin, with bare heads and burnt to a cinder with the swords in their scorched hands still rising and slaying, fear overwhelmed them. They fled in panic . . . (6:50).

The total Mongol force pressed the attack on all sides. Chinese soldiers who witnessed the Mangoday attack fled into other Chinese ranks and unbalanced them. Victory belonged to Genghis' force (6:50). He matched missions to units based on how combat would affect them and regularly gained the victory.

SUMMARY

Genghis exemplified the imperatives known today in AirLand Battle doctrine. This analysis of selected battles and campaigns reveals the application of each AirLand Battle imperative. "While the conditions of warfare change with time and circumstance, the fundamental dynamics of violent conflict remain unaltered" (8:26). These conceptual imperatives are shown as applied operational art and battle strategy through study of Genghis Khan's campaigns. The final chapter provides the application of these concepts by today's warrior-leaders.

Chapter Four

APPLICATION/CONCLUSION

APPLICATION

As shown in the preceding chapters, we must use the leadership concepts of Genghis Khan to fight and win the AirLand Battle! This chapter provides examples of how we must apply the leadership concepts of Genghis Khan.

Genghis' proven leadership concepts apply to today's warrior-leaders. The ten imperatives of AirLand Battle embody the same leadership concepts demonstrated by Genghis Khan. This chapter explains why and how these imperatives must be applied today within operational art and battlefield situations. Modern warrior-leaders face numerically superior enemies, forbidding terrain, and harsh weather. Our country's survival hinges on victory. Leaders must lead as Genghis led his warriors seven centuries ago. As a conceptual approach to this application, Genghis' leadership concepts will be applied to modern U.S. warrior-leaders facing a Soviet force in Southwest Asia--the former Karzamian Empire.

Unlike those who rode to victory in Southwest Asia with Genghis, this nation's leaders and warriors are mostly untested in battle. The opening battle may determine the survival of the entire force. Even after successful experience in war, Genghis trained his warriors thoroughly

before marching to war. Individual and unit training was continual and realistic. Long before deployment, today's leaders must ensure our warriors experience common training in cohesive units. Subordinate leaders must understand common doctrine, plans, and tactics. When deployed the leader must permit initiative in execution by stating his intent to subordinates in a broad, unrestrictive manner. Like Genghis' generals, subordinate leaders must take educated risks--and be permitted to take such risks--to fulfill the senior leader's intent. By these means warrior-leaders can **ENSURE UNITY OF EFFORT** against the Soviet force. Strong unity is required to succeed in the main effort against a much larger Soviet force.

Awesome violence in the scorching deserts or rugged mountains of Southwest Asia can cause physical and emotional casualties among U.S. warriors. Training prior to deployment must include achieving top physical condition among the total force. Warrior-leaders must understand, "Well trained, physically fit soldiers in cohesive units retain the qualities of tenacity and aggressiveness longer than those which are not" (8:26). He must **UNDERSTAND THE EFFECTS OF BATTLE ON SOLDIERS, UNITS, AND LEADERS** and watch for signs of detrimental combat stress. Genghis trained warriors and developed subordinate leaders to fight outnumbered and win in Southwest Asia. U.S. leaders of spirited, volunteer units can use his concepts to achieve the same.

As the elite Mangoday penetrated enemy ranks to kill or capture the enemy commander, modern warrior-leaders must send capable units to "seek out the enemy where he is most vulnerable to defeat" (8:23).

Leaders must CONCENTRATE COMBAT POWER AGAINST ENEMY VULNERABILITIES in the channelized mountain passes of Southwest Asia. Application of this concept could involve sending special operations forces deep in the Soviet rear to disrupt command and control. The leader must identify enemy areas of greatest vulnerability through careful intelligence gathering, just as Genghis sought and studied intelligence reports before employing his forces.

Like Genghis, modern warrior-leaders must ANTICIPATE EVENTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD. While few today have accumulated the extensive experience of Genghis, warrior-leaders should devote much study time to the enemy, terrain, and weather of the next battlefield. With such knowledge and foresight they can think like their enemy, following AirLand Battle guidance to "anticipate the enemy's actions and reactions" (8:23). This foreknowledge enables leaders to visualize future events and plan how to shape the battle. They can then secure and initiate the main effort.

If ordered to secure vital Southwest Asian oilfields or Persian Gulf ports, leaders risk defeat if they fail to conceal intent and capabilities from the Soviets. Warrior-leaders must USE TERRAIN, WEATHER, DECEPTION, AND OPERATIONS SECURITY "...confusing the enemy and reducing his foreknowledge of friendly actions" (8:24). The Soviets must not be allowed to do to us what we are doing to them. Genghis' most masterful application of this concept occurred in Southwest Asia when he used a desert to outflank the Karzamian forces. Mobile U.S. forces must also utilize dangerous mountains and desert to strike by surprise.

Warrior-leaders must CONSERVE STRENGTH FOR DECISIVE ACTION. They must maintain the initiative through deception and maneuver to unbalance and confuse the Soviets. "Successful commanders conserve the strength of their forces to be stronger at the decisive time and place" (8:24). Genghis set the example when he held back his reserve until he had shaped the battle for a quick, decisive blow.

Modern warrior-leaders must also display agility in decision-making and maneuver. They must MOVE FAST, STRIKE HARD, AND FINISH RAPIDLY with offensive action. Even when defending the oilfields or denying Gulf ports to the Soviets, defending warriors must be instilled with an offensive spirit. "Engagements must be violent to shock, paralyze, and overwhelm the enemy force quickly" (8:24). As soon as victory is achievable, the initiative must be seized and a counterattack launched. Leaders must anticipate their enemy's weakness and assign well trained units the main effort of exploiting the weakness. Facing Soviet armored forces in echelons, warrior-leaders must retain flexibility to DESIGNATE, SUSTAIN, AND SHIFT THE MAIN EFFORT. A Soviet resupply effort could be encountered to the rear of enemy combat formations. A leader might take the initiative to destroy the enemy force while it exists in this vulnerable disposition.

Wherever and whenever the enemy is encountered, warrior-leaders "must accept risks and tenaciously press soldiers and systems to the limits of endurance for as long as necessary" (8:24). They must PRESS THE FIGHT to seize and maintain the initiative. Genghis attacked relentlessly with combined arms to keep the enemy commander unbalanced. Following his

leadership example, warrior-leaders must COMBINE ARMS AND SISTER SERVICES TO COMPLEMENT AND REINFORCE. Genghis used artillery preparation and engineers to gain the advantage in siege warfare. In open country he used combined forces of light and heavy cavalry to complement and reinforce. Today's warrior-leaders can keep the Soviets off balance with violent, synchronized attacks from jet aircraft, attack helicopters, artillery, and direct fire weapons. "As [the enemy] evades the effects of one weapon, arm or service, he exposes himself to attack by another" (8:25). By agilely employing all resources available in the Southwest Asia theater, warrior-leaders can overcome the numerical advantage of the Soviet foe. By utilizing the leadership concepts of Genghis Khan embodied in the ten imperatives of AirLand Battle, warrior-leaders can achieve victory in Southwest Asia--or anywhere else in the world.

CONCLUSION

We must be modern Genghis Khans to fight and win against numerically superior forces on the modern battlefield! Review of events in Genghis' life reveals extensive leadership development and application. Study of his battles and campaigns provides the leadership concepts which united nomadic tribes into a nation and gave them victory over the greatest empires of their day. Genghis' leadership enabled his forces to overcome the odds and obstacles of the enemy, weather, and terrain. His leadership concepts correspond in analysis to the ten imperatives of AirLand Battle. These leadership concepts are timeless "kernels of truth, as applicable today . . . as they were when, seven centuries ago, the great

Mongol applied them . . ." (4:64). Modern leaders must understand and apply these concepts to successfully lead warriors to victory in the AirLand Battle.

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While initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization characterize successful AirLand Battle operations, the imperatives listed below prescribe key operating requirements. These provide more specific guidance than the principles of war and the AirLand Battle tenets, and apply to all operations. They are historically valid and fundamentally necessary for success on the modern battlefield. The ten imperatives of AirLand Battle are—

- Ensure unity of effort.
- Anticipate events on the battlefield.
- Concentrate combat power against enemy vulnerabilities.
- Designate, sustain, and shift the main effort.
- Press the fight.
- Move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly.
- Use terrain, weather, deception, and OPSEC.
- Conserve strength for decisive action.
- Combine arms and sister services to complement and reinforce.
- Understand the effects of battle on soldiers, units, and leaders.

ENSURE UNITY OF EFFORT

Commands must not only ensure unity of effort within their own organizations, but must also promote it with supporting and supported elements as well as with sister services and allies. The fundamental prerequisite for unity of effort within Army organizations is an effective system of command which relies upon leadership to provide purpose, direction, and motivation; emphasizes well-understood common doctrine, tactics, and techniques as well as sound unit standing operating procedures (SOPs); and takes effective measures to limit the effects of friction. Leaders set the example, communicate their intent clearly,

build teamwork, promote sound values, accept responsibility, delegate authority, anticipate developments, take decisive actions, and accept risks. Command and control systems emphasize implicit coordination measures such as sound training in a common doctrine, standing operating procedures, methods, and techniques, and well-rehearsed battle drills. Missions are clear and concise. Plans are simple. Control mechanisms are easy to apply, understand, and communicate. Habitual relationships are used to maximize teamwork. A main effort is always clearly designated and ground plans are thoroughly coordinated with plans for air support. All actions throughout the force are performed so as to ensure the success of the main effort. Liaison among units must be automatic and effective.

ANTICIPATE EVENTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD

The commander must anticipate the enemy's actions and reactions and must be able to foresee how operations may develop. Predictions about the enemy and even our own troops can never be relied on with certainty, but it is nevertheless essential to anticipate what is possible and likely and prepare for those possibilities. Anticipating events and foreseeing the shape of possibilities hours, days, or weeks in the future are two of the most difficult skills to develop, yet among the most important. They require wisdom, experience, and understanding of the enemy's methods, capabilities, and inclinations, outstanding intelligence, and confidence in the knowledge of how one's own forces will perform. Anticipation and foresight are critical to turning inside the enemy's decision cycle and maintaining the initiative.

CONCENTRATE COMBAT POWER AGAINST ENEMY VULNERABILITIES

Concentrating combat power against enemy vulnerabilities is also fundamental to AirLand Battle operations. Commanders must seek out the enemy where he is most vulnerable to defeat. To know what his vulnerabilities are, commanders must study the enemy, know and take into account his

strengths, find his inherent vulnerabilities, and know how to create new vulnerabilities which can be exploited to decisive effect. Having identified or created enemy vulnerabilities, the commander must have the mental and organizational flexibility to shift his main effort as necessary to gain the greatest possible advantage. Combat power must be concentrated to reach points of enemy vulnerability quickly without loss of synchronization.

DESIGNATE, SUSTAIN, AND SHIFT THE MAIN EFFORT

In operations characterized by initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization, it is imperative that commanders designate, sustain and shift the main effort as necessary during operations. The main effort is assigned to the element with the most important task to accomplish within the commander's concept. The commander concentrates his support to ensure quick success by this element. The commander identifies the main effort when he states his concept of the operation. This provides a focus of effort that each subordinate commander uses to link his actions to the actions of those around him. The main effort assures synchronization in the operation while leaving the greatest possible scope for initiative. During operations, the main effort is sustained with supporting forces and assets. If conditions change and success of the overall mission can be obtained more cheaply or quickly another way, the commander shifts his main effort to another force. Priorities of support also change to assure the success of the newly designated main effort.

PRESS THE FIGHT

Commanders must press the fight tenaciously and aggressively. Campaigns or battles are won by the force that is most successful in pressing its main effort to a conclusion. To sustain the momentum of early successes, leaders must deploy forces in adequate depth and arrange for timely and continuous combat support and combat service support at the outset of operations. Then, they must accept risks and

tenaciously press soldiers and systems to the limits of endurance for as long as necessary.

MOVE FAST, STRIKE HARD, AND FINISH RAPIDLY

Speed has always been important to combat operations, but it will be even more important on the next battlefield because of the increasing sophistication of sensors and the increasing lethality of conventional, nuclear, and chemical fires. To avoid detection, our force concentrations must be disguised. To avoid effective counterstrikes, they must be brief. Engagements must be violent to shock, paralyze, and overwhelm the enemy force quickly. They must be terminated rapidly to allow the force to disperse and avoid effective enemy counterstrikes.

USE TERRAIN, WEATHER, DECEPTION, AND OPSEC

Terrain and weather affect combat more significantly than any other physical factors. Battles are won or lost by the way in which combatants use the terrain to protect their own forces and to destroy those of the enemy. The ground and the airspace immediately above it have an immense influence on how the battle will be fought. They provide opportunities and impose limitations, giving a decisive edge to the commander who uses them best. The impact of weather on ground and air mobility and the effect both have on weapons will affect tactics and the timing and course of operations. One of the best investments of the commander's time before battle is an intensive, personal reconnaissance of the terrain. Similarly, effective deception and tight operations security can enhance combat power by confusing the enemy and reducing his foreknowledge of friendly actions.

CONSERVE STRENGTH FOR DECISIVE ACTION

Successful commanders conserve the strength of their forces to be stronger at the decisive time and place. Commanders

must minimize the diversion of resources to nonessential tasks and retain a reserve for commitment when needed most. Commanders must also keep troops secure, protected, healthy, disciplined, and in a high state of morale. In addition they must keep equipment ready and stocks of supplies available for commitment when needed. Finally, units must be maintained in a high state of training. Dispersed and rapid movement, proper formations, covered and concealed fighting positions, aggressive patrolling, good operations security, protection of troops and equipment from adverse weather and disease, and good supply and maintenance discipline are all examples of measures which conserve a force's strength.

COMBINE ARMS AND SISTER SERVICES TO COMPLEMENT AND REINFORCE

The greatest combat power results when weapons and other hardware, combat and supporting arms, Army units, and other service elements of different capabilities are employed together to complement and reinforce each other. Arms and services complement each other by posing a dilemma for the enemy. As he evades the effects of one weapon, arm, or service, he exposes himself to attack by another. At the level of weapons systems, one good example of complementary combined arms employment would be the use of guns and missiles in the air defense of a key installation. Another would be using mines, mortars, or grenade launchers to cover the dead space of a machine gun's field of fire. A tactical example of complementary combined arms would be combining infantry and armor in task forces or combining infantry-heavy and armor-heavy task forces in brigades. Another example of tactical level complementary combined arms employment between the services is when Air Force Aircraft attack tanks in defilade and out of reach of direct ground fires and attack helicopters while artillery and direct fires suppress enemy air defenses. At the

operational level, an example would be Air Force Air Superiority operations and ground maneuver, or employing light infantry formations in highly mountainous regions to free armor and mechanized forces for use in less restricted areas.

Arms and services reinforce each other when one increases the effectiveness of another or several combine to achieve mass. Some examples at the technical level would be engineers helping to develop an infantry strong point which greatly enhances the combat power of the infantry, the scout helicopter spotting targets for the attack helicopter, artillery suppression of enemy fires during an assault, or the massing of all antitank fires against an armored threat. Tactically, reinforcement may involve concentrating all types of maneuver forces or fires to create mass. It might also involve heliborne lift of light infantry. Operationally, it could mean using Naval amphibious shipping or Air Force tactical airlift to deliver soldiers to the battlefield, intelligence support to Army units from Air Force, Naval, or national sources, Air Force interdiction to support maneuver on the ground, or US Army units protecting air bases from ground attack.

Finally, both effects are combined in one action as when mines, artillery, and tanks combine to defeat an attack. All three reinforce to damage the enemy simultaneously to some degree. The mines and artillery fire slow the enemy and complement the tank fire which can obtain more hits against the stalled enemy.

UNDERSTAND THE EFFECT OF BATTLE ON SOLDIERS, UNITS, AND LEADERS

Commanders and their staffs must understand the effects of battle on soldiers, units, and leaders because war is fundamentally a contest of wills, fought by men not machines. Ardant DuPiq, a 19th century soldier and student of men in battle, reminded us that "you can reach into the

well of courage only so many times before the well runs dry." Even before that Marshall De Saxe, writing in the 18th century, pointed out that "A soldier's courage must be reborn daily," and went on to say that the most important task of leaders was to understand this, to care for and prepare soldiers before battle, and to use tactics during battle which take this into account.

Commanders must understand that in battle, men and units are more likely to fail catastrophically than gradually. Commanders and staffs must be alert to small indicators of fatigue, fear, indiscipline, and reduced morale, and take measures to deal with these before their cumulative effects drive a unit to the threshold of collapse. Staffs and commanders at higher levels must take into account the impact of prolonged combat on subordinate units. Military organizations can fight at peak efficiency for only so long. Prolonged demands of combat cause efficiency to drop even when physical losses are not great. Well trained, physically fit soldiers

in cohesive units retain the qualities of tenacity and aggressiveness longer than those which are not.

Good leadership makes the vital difference in the staying power and effectiveness of units. Although all units experience peaks and valleys in combat effectiveness, well-trained, cohesive units under good leadership sustain far higher average effectiveness. Staffs and commanders need to take this variance in performance into account in their planning by matching units to missions, rotating units through difficult tasks to permit recuperation to the extent possible, and by basing their expectations of a unit's performance on a full knowledge of its current capabilities.

Because modern combat requires greater dispersal of units, the quality and effectiveness of junior leaders has a proportionately greater impact. Prior to combat, senior leaders must place great emphasis on junior leader development. During combat, commanders must monitor and take measures to sustain the effectiveness of leaders to the extent possible.

AirLand Battle doctrine is evolutionary. While the conditions of warfare change with time and circumstance, the fundamental dynamics of violent conflict remain unaltered. The essential qualities of skill, tenacity, boldness, and courage which have always marked successful armies and commanders will continue to determine the victor in battle in the future, as they have in the past.

AirLand Battle doctrine exploits those qualities, together with the technological prowess, self-reliance and offensive spirit which characterize the American soldier. It requires combined arms and joint forces to extend the battlefield and thus hold at risk all enemy forces, harnessing advanced technologies to provide synchronized reconnaissance, real-time intelligence fusion, target attack, and maneuver. While respecting the increased complexity and lethality of modern weapons, however, AirLand Battle doctrine also recognizes that such weapons are no better than the skill with which they are brought to bear on the enemy. Properly understood and instilled through effective training, the principles of operation prescribed by AirLand Battle doctrine will produce the skill to match the US Army's will to win.

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